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Family planning programmes in India have historically been target-driven and incentive-
based with sterilisation seen as a key component of controlling population growth.  This 
opinion paper uses India as the backcloth to examine the ethics of using incentive policy 
measures to promote and secure sterilisations within communities.  Whilst we acknowledge 
that these measures have some value in reproductive health care, their use raises specific 
issues and wider concerns where the outcome is likely to be permanent and life changing for 











In early February 2020, The Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2020 was introduced into the 
Rajya Sabha or Upper House of the Parliament of India, seeking amendment to Article 47 of 
the Constitution of India: 
 
47A. The State shall promote small family norms by offering incentives in taxes, 
employment, education, etc. to its people who keep their family limited to two children 
and shall withdraw every concession from and deprive such incentives to those not 
adhering to small family norm, to keep the growing population under control [1]. 
 
Clearly, the proposer’s intention is to limit family size using a range of incentives and 
punitive policy measures, with a view to controlling national population growth [2]. 
 
This opinion piece considers the specific use of incentives in connection with national and 
regional sterilisation programmes, drawing upon a range of contemporary examples and 
literature focussing on India to develop our central arguments.  We do not examine explicit 
coercion, or incentives offered by non-State actors (including members of an acceptor’s 
family).  Nor do we spend any time discussing the key factors for population growth – suffice 
to say, that some countries have used targeted sterilisation of their citizens when populations 
are deemed to be too large and/or growing too fast.  Although we use the term ‘acceptor’ to 
denote the person who has undergone the sterilisation, it should not be construed as meaning 




Materials and Methods 
 
Our search strategy was to look for material freely available on the subject of incentivised 
sterilisation, focusing on examples from the Indian subcontinent.   We have used this 
demographic because there are plenty of contemporary examples of incentives being used in 
the context of sterilisation.  Our sources included empirical studies, journals in various 
disciplines, books, theses, documentary films, government publications, publications by non-
governmental organisations, articles in the lay press and information from reliable internet 
sources.  We have highlighted a range of arguments, including those for and against 
incentivised sterilisation programmes.   However, we openly declare our preference for rights 
based ethical frameworks over teleological ones. 
 
A Brief Overview 
 
The total number of sterilisations in India is running at 3.36 million per year [3]. The 
prevalence of female sterilisation of married women in India in 2015 was 36%; the 
equivalent figure for men who have had a vasectomy was 0.3% [4]. Vasectomies, as a 
proportion of total sterilisations in India, have decreased from 20% in 2009/10 [5] to 1.4% in 
2018/19 [3].   Table 1 provides additional data about contraceptive use in India based upon 
the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Annual Report for 2018-19: 
[INSERT Table 1] 
In 2013/14, India spent 85% of its fertility control budget on sterilisation [6]. Of the INR3.97 
billion (US$58 million) spent on female sterilisation, INR3.24 billion was spent on incentives 
and compensation [7].  In 2016, the Supreme Court of India in the case of Devika Biswas v 
Union of India ordered that sterilisation camps [8, 9, 10] should cease within three years, a 
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counsellor should see the potential acceptor as well as a doctor, and sterilisation targets 
should not result in coercion [11]. However, the incentivisation of sterilisation was not 
expressly prohibited at the time. The proposed constitutional amendment [1] endorses the 
promotion of national/ regional incentives with a view to limiting family size.  Here the 
incentivisation is being linked directly to broader decisions around family planning, rather 
than to specific medical procedures/ narrow contraceptive options [12].  The merits of the 
former are for another paper - our focus is on direct incentivisation of sterilisation as a form 
of contraception.  We will argue that the permanency and life changing nature of sterilisation 
is an important consideration for these policy measures [13]. 
 
Demographic and Cultural Issues 
 
It is freely acknowledged that commenting on this subject in a meaningful way is fraught 
with difficulty due to cultural complexity. Citizens belonging to higher social classes tend to 
choose and undergo sterilisation in private hospitals in a high-quality clinical environment. 
Poorer people may opt for sterilisation as an expression of pragmatic agency in the context of 
their precarious economic circumstances, unequal gender relations and constantly weakening 
bodies [14].  Intersectionality [15] has featured prominently in sterilisation, with acceptors 
coming disproportionately from vulnerable groups - including those from lower educational 
and socio-economic groups [16].  These intersectional features can create an environment 
that makes it more likely that incentives, and other default State practices or policies, will 
have a coercive or adverse impact on individual autonomy, which may never be fully 
realisable in any event [17].  Our general concern is centred on the way intersectionality 
impacts on the exercise of State power and consequential justice, although the identity of 




Policy Measures  
 
A range of policy measures or instruments are available to State actors (and officials who 
represent them) to control fertility - from compulsory medical examination checks and forced 
sterilisation, to subtler forms of control including education, reward, incentive and penalty 
measures.  These policies can be divided into those that mandate individual action or 
consequences (negative), and those that aim to influence or otherwise facilitate specific 
decisions and outcomes (positive). States can use ‘negative’ policy instruments to influence 
birth rates, including punishments, penalties or other sanction on those who refuse 
sterilisation or any other attempt to control their fertility.  For example, in India ration cards 
have been withheld from eligible couples who refuse sterilisation [19].  Further, parents who 
fail to produce sterilisation certificates have been refused nutritional supplements for their 
existing children. From 2001 in Maharashtra, a third child was not entitled to food and other 
subsidised goods offered under the public distribution scheme [20].  
 
Positive policy measures can be subdivided into nudges, boosts and other incentive measures 
either intended to benefit the individual patient or designed to achieve wider community 
goals.  Although, our focus is on positive deliberative measures, both types of policy can be 
combined to achieve their intended effects – as evidenced during the Gandhi emergency 
period in the 1970s [21]. Nudges ‘seek to affect decision-making by semi-conscious or 
unconscious “altering defaults” in the framing of choices’ [22, 23] and can be aimed at 
correcting detrimental behaviours impacting on the individual or others [24].  A nudge can be 
categorised as an intervention or practice that prioritises a default outcome – requiring an 
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individual to make an active choice to avoid that pre-set outcome.  Nudges are in operation in 
schemes that require an active ‘opt out’ to avoid the default consequence. 
 
Conversely, boosts are designed to “extend people's decision-making competence rather than 
co-opting their deficits” [24].  Boosts ‘can target the individual’s skills and knowledge, the 
available set of decision tools, or the environment in which decisions are made’ [25]. The 
concept of ‘boosts’ has become increasingly popular, partly because of the emphasis on 
enhancing existing competency, and because nudges have attracted criticism for their 
tendency to treat individuals as “mindless, passive decision makers” [25]. 
 
Incentives are normally addressed explicitly and directly at an individual or a specific group 
(less common with nudges) and are designed to change or influence the behaviour or 
decision-making of that individual/ group [12].  Relevant examples include an offer to cover 
lost wages or pay direct food/ transport costs associated with a sterilisation, or an offer of 
payment to a third party for recruitment of sterilisation acceptors. In this paper, we are not 
concerned with strategies that use the ‘common good’ as the exclusive benefit on offer to the 
acceptor [12]. 
 
The Ethical Arguments 
 
State-supported incentives are capable of influencing the wider public narrative, and can 
create subtle forms of pressure and influence on decision-makers, particularly when coupled 
with the wider promotion of responsible reproduction within a community [21].  If a State 
promotes ‘responsible reproduction’ and associates that with sterilisation, it can set up subtle 
pressure mechanisms that have the capacity to label ‘non-acceptors’ as irresponsible 
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community members.  This is significant if the target of the incentive (acceptor, motivator or 
provider) is a member of a group(s) with pre-existing vulnerability.  Incentive offers to 
groups within a community that rely on acceptance by a large proportion of that group, can 
create subtle forms of pressure as well as a platform for coercion [12]. The need for openness 
and honesty about the objectives of and process for development of any incentive policy 
measure are, we believe, self-evident [12]. 
 
When evaluating incentives, we should differentiate the type of benefit, reward or financial 
compensation that is available to the target agent (i.e. the individual or group to whom the 
incentive is directed).  We should also distinguish between benefits directed towards 
particular subjects or individuals, and recognise that incentives directed at multiple agents 
can combine to collectively influence overall behaviour and outcomes.  In India, this has 
involved the use of State incentives directed at individual families, patients, healthcare 
providers and third-party motivators [21]. Some incentives may only reimburse an individual 
for out-of-pocket expenses, facilitating the attendance of the acceptor at the treating clinic. 
Others may include an element of extra reward for the acceptor or for members of their 
family. The personal circumstances of the potential acceptor and their family may affect the 
persuasive impact of the reward – a vulnerable individual with limited economic means may 
be more prone to impact by offers of this type [26].  The promise of an incentive when 
coupled with the threat of sanction may be particularly effective in ‘persuading’ vulnerable 
individuals.   
 
Cash payments were common in India for sterilisation acceptors from the 1960s onwards, but 
inducements for female sterilisation have included goods such as televisions and pressure 
cookers too. Women acceptors are typically paid INR1,000 to INR1,400 (equivalent to 
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almost a month’s income in rural areas) [27]. A recent Annual Report confirms that 
vasectomy acceptors using public facilities will receive INR2,000 in ‘high-focus’ states and 
INR1,100 elsewhere; female sterilisation acceptors using public facilities will receive 
INR1,400 in high-focus states and INR600 elsewhere [28]. In some cases, the incentive cash 
sums have been more than twice as much in value as average monthly wages [29], large sums 
having the capacity to make a disproportionate impact on vulnerable groups. 
 
The use of performance-based incentives for community family planning programmes is 
fairly widespread across the world, with sales commissions for uptake and referral payments 
for women using long-acting or permanent contraceptive methods dominating [30]. A 
scheme for six high-focus states in India (the Santushti Strategy) incentivised private health 
providers when they performed 10 or more sterilisations per month. This type of scheme has 
the capacity to undermine the ‘free and informed’ nature of the consent process because 
healthcare professionals (HCP) have to address the implicit influence of additional personal 
benefit.  These schemes set up potential conflict and tension between the personal interests of 
the HCP and their beneficent duties to their patient.   
 
Mass sterilisation campaigns have also used lay workers/ ‘motivators’ to recruit 'acceptors' in 
India.  Some Indian States took extreme measures with the use of motivators and the use of 
recruitment targets: in Madhya Pradesh a Tata Nano car was offered to motivators for 
recruiting 500 subjects for an operation, a fridge for 50 and a gold coin for 25 [31].  
Motivators are typically paid INR150 for each individual brought to be sterilised [32, 33]. In 
June 2012, Human Rights Watch interviewed more than 50 health workers in two districts in 




Where a third-party agent is incentivised, this may add to social and other pressure on 
individuals who might already be weighing up the benefits for themselves and their wider 
family.  In some cases, the healthcare provider or agent will be eroding or receiving a cut of 
the incentive that would otherwise have been available to the acceptor [21].  Sales 
commission for motivators can also distort what family planning options are offered to 
women – for example, the promotion of short-term over long-term contraceptive methods, if 
commission is only available following immediate take-up [30].  Further, we should not 
ignore the circumstances of the motivator/ provider – they may be vulnerable to the effects of 
the incentive and commission-based financial remuneration may be unfair to those from 
lower socio-economic backgrounds [30]. 
 
The International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics (FIGO) condemns inducements, 
pressure and coercion in relation to sterilisation, claiming that coercion brings a reproductive 
health programme into disrepute, jeopardising the limitation of fertility [35]. Individual 
freedom and reproductive autonomy are clearly important human values, especially for 
women who bear the physical burden of pregnancy.  International law says that couples 
should have the right to decide freely and responsibly on the number, spacing and timing of 
their children [36], although whether this provides an unqualified right to bear any number of 
children is arguable [12].  Reproductive liberty demands that sterilisation decisions should be 
free of undue influence by third parties. State endorsed or facilitated incentives, penalties and 
other forms of coercion have the potential to erode and negatively impact on this conception 
of reproductive liberty and autonomy.  However, we must also recognise that these influences 
and decisions are occurring in circumstances where autonomy may already be compromised 
or qualified [12, 17]. We agree with Bellows et al. that the challenge is to ‘construct 
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incentives that are effective but not coercive, where one does not merely shift the coercive 
power to community leaders’ [30].   
 
We also need to be cautious about our ethical evaluation of incentive measures and not ‘make 
broad brush assumptions about “behaviour change” interventions as if they were 
homogeneous in type, design, intended effect, mechanism of action, or underlying ethical 
norms’ [22]. Further, our response will be influenced by the specific ethical lens we decide to 
employ and whether emphasis is placed on individual rights, community justice or collective 
goals [22]. Those in favour of incentives, tend to place greater emphasis on the collective 
management of population levels, or the achievement of wider population health benefits 
[30].   Whilst, there has been a shift towards the recognition of individual reproductive rights 
[7, 37], incentives are still widely used in family planning programmes across the world [30].  
Even if consequentialist [38] sterilisation policies can be justified, State actors still need to 
establish (1) that these are effective means to achieve the intended goal(s) and (2) that due 
regard has been given to the broader concepts of justice and equality [12] for those targeted 
by any collective incentive scheme.  Given that there is incomplete evidence about the 
effectiveness of different types of incentive [30], the use of collective measures in relation to 
sterilisation makes this evaluation especially problematic.   
 
The availability of other effective and publicly acceptable contraceptive options may also be 
relevant.  Past negative experience with intrauterine devices may have influenced the 
development of sterilisation policies in India [21].  The public narrative around options and 
the balanced availability of incentives for reversible and irreversible forms of contraception 
are also likely to be important.  Again, we need to be careful that incentive schemes do not 
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themselves accidentally alter what contraceptive options are prioritised, irrespective of 
individual interests [30]. 
 
The timing of incentives may also be important, both in terms of when the promise is made 
and when the benefit is received [12].   Benefits offered at a time of vulnerability for an 
individual (e.g. at, or shortly after, birth) are problematic if the decision-making and 
information-receiving processes are potentially impaired [13] (see Table 1).  FIGO 
specifically rules that the consent process must not be timed when women are in pain [35].   
 
Belief that incentives will be fulfilled is likely to be important in communities that have 
experienced historical broken promises in relation to incentives [21].  Where a promised 
reward or benefit is deliberately withheld it undermines the informational component of 
consent.  It is therefore important that there are transparent mechanisms available to record 
and adjudicate individual incentive regimes and payments. 
 
Rewards that do not directly benefit the acceptor should be approached with caution, and 
should point against the use of motivator or provider rewards based on numeric procedural 
outcomes if they create a tension between the interests of the motivator and any duty of care 
owed to the acceptor [7].  Payments to acceptors that exceed direct out-of-pocket expenses 
are more likely to undermine autonomous decision-making, especially if directed to those of 
low socio-economic status [7].  Sterilisation incentives should only be considered in 
communities that offer a range of accessible contraceptive options; and safe sterilisation 
methods should be available to all genders with proper non-directive counselling 
mechanisms.  It is equally important that the use of reversible forms of contraception must 
not be coercive or directed at the target groups highlighted above [15, 21, 39].  Finally, whilst 
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local operation of incentive schemes may offer political distance, it ought not to extricate 
central policymakers from responsibility for coercive practices that they have actively, albeit 




With the development and introduction of highly effective reversible methods of 
contraception, there are alternatives to sterilisation. Coercive sterilisation programmes are not 
appropriate, although abuse still occurs around the world.  Sterilisation is an option that 
should be readily available as part of an overall reproductive health service for those who 
request it. It is important that potential acceptors have access to adequate informational tools 
and education provision to be able to make informed decisions about their reproductive 
options. 
 
In this paper, we have argued for specific caution around the future use and implementation 
of incentive schemes in relation to sterilisation. We do not claim that incentive schemes have 
no value in health care generally or reproductive health care more specifically.  Rather our 
intention is to highlight the specific issues and wider concerns where the outcome is likely to 
be permanent and life changing for the acceptor.  We are especially troubled by incentives 
directed to service providers or third-party motivators, or those which involve more than 
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